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Abstract
In recent years, Bolivia has experienced a series of economic and political transformations
that have directly affected the labor markets, particularly the salaried urban sector. Real wages
have shown strong increases across the distribution, while also presenting a decrease in inequal-
ity. Using an intertemporal decomposition approach, we find evidence that changes in demo-
graphic and labor market characteristics can explain only a small portion of the observed in-
equality decline. Instead, the results indicate that the decline in wage inequality was driven by
the faster wage growth of usually low-paid jobs, and wage stagnation of jobs that require higher
education or are in traditionally highly paid fields. While the evidence shows that the reduction
in inequality is significant, we suggest that such an improvement might not be sustainable in the
long run, since structural factors associated with productivity, such as workers’ level of education,
explain only a small portion of these wage changes.
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Over the past decade, inequality in Bolivia has declined sharply, which was reflected in a Gini
index fall from 0.62 (2000) to 0.47 (2012)1. This trend is not unique in the region, as many coun-
tries exhibited similar declines in inequality over the same period, especially after the second part
of the decade (Lustig, Lopez-Calva, and Ortiz-Juarez, 2013; Gasparini and Lustig, 2011).
The existing literature suggests three explanations of these trends in inequality, which are
also close to the Bolivian experience: improvements in the macroeconomic environment for de-
veloping countries, establishment of larger and better conditional cash transfer programs, changes
in the structure of the labor market, and reduction in gender and race wage gaps (see Jime´nez,
2012; Gray-Molina and Yan˜ez, 2009). It is undeniable that labor markets play a key role in deter-
mining the evolution of inequality in Bolivia. In fact, there is compelling evidence from several
countries that shows changes in labor income inequality are the most important determinants of
the recent reduction in income inequality2, especially considering that labor income accounts for
around 80 percent of total household incomes.
This paper aims to analyze which factors are driving the strong declines in labor income in-
equality experienced in Bolivia since 2000. Using household survey data from 2000 to 2012, we
have analyzed trends in wage levels and distribution among salary workers in Bolivia. A gener-
alization of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition proposed by Firpo, Fortin, and Lemieux (2007) is
used to analyze how different factors may explain the changes observed in wage distribution over
the past twelve years. Four lessons can be drawn from our results. First, we have found evidence
suggesting that changes in demographic and labor market characteristics explain only a small
(and insignificant) portion of the observed inequality decline. Second, most of the wage inequal-
ity decline can be explained by faster wage growth in the lower segment of the wage distribution
compared to the higher segment. Third, upon closer look, the wage structure decomposition indi-
cates that the fall in the returns on education and changes in the occupational/industry structure of
the labor market have been the main contributors to the decline in wage inequality. Finally, there
is a large portion of this decline that remains unexplained, which could potentially be linked to
the rising minimum wage in Bolivia and other unaccounted factors. To the extent that the changes
1UDAPE (2014) “Se´ptimo Informe de Progreso de los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio en Bolivia.” Accessed
January 15, 2015. http://goo.gl/sjkBgD
2For further evidence, see Azevedo, Inchauste, and Sanfelice (2013) and Gasparini and Lustig (2011).
2
in the returns to characteristics, particularly education and occupation, are driven by short term
economic policies, these results suggest that improvements in inequality might not be sustainable
in the long run.
Different explanations for the decline in wage inequality in Latin America have been of-
fered. Lustig et al. (2013), Fortun-Vargas (2012), and Gasparini and Lustig (2011) suggest that
the trends in wage inequality have been mainly driven by declining returns on education. Oth-
ers, like Borraz and Pampillo´n (2011) and Bosch and Manacorda (2010), have attributed most
of the decline in wage inequality to changes in the real minimum wage and to the strengthening
of labor unions. Others, like Gray-Molina and Yan˜ez (2009), have suggested that demographic
changes, greater labor force participation, and (partially) educational improvements have signif-
icantly contributed to the decline in wage inequality. Finally, authors such as Snower (1998) and
Chen, Snower, and Zoega (2003) have attributed the decline in wage inequality to a structural
shift in occupations and industries caused by macroeconomic shocks.
We argue that changes in the labor market are key when examining wage inequality in Bo-
livia for a number of reasons: First, an increase in the size of the government has led to high lev-
els of public job creation in the country despite a shortage of jobs in the formal private sector.
This has contributed to a decline in Bolivia’s unemployment rate along with a small reduction
in the size of the informal economy. Second, Bolivia, one of the largest exporters of gas in the
region, benefited from the increase in commodity prices, which has resulted in higher income
and higher economic growth for the country. Third, the Bolivian government has implemented
aggressive economic policies aiming to increase wages at the bottom of the wage distribution,
mainly driven by increases in the minimum wage.
The Bolivian case is unique for a number of reasons. On one hand, Bolivia has undergone
a number of significant political and economic changes3 that began in 2006 with the election of
Evo Morales Ayma, Bolivia’s first indigenous and socialist president. The main characteristics
of this government are an expansion of the public sector and the establishment of a more com-
prehensive social assistance system in the form of conditional cash transfers for the poor, partic-
ularly children, as well as direct transfers for certain demographic groups (e.g., the elderly and
the indigenous) (Fundacio´n Milenio, 2014; Durana, 2012). In addition, the significant increase in
commodity prices (gas in particular) experienced over the past ten years has led to an increase in
3In 2009 Bolivia changed its name from Republica de Bolivia to Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia. To avoid confusion
we are using the name Bolivia across the document.
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disposable income in the country, which is reflected in better macroeconomic conditions as well
as a sharp decline in poverty levels (see CEDLAS, 2009). Some empirical evidence (see Jime´nez,
2012) argues that these changes have had a direct effect on labor market structure through a gen-
eral equilibrium process that has led to reductions in wage inequality, especially in the formal
market.
There is no conclusive evidence regarding the decline in wage inequality. However, some re-
search, such as that conducted by Jime´nez (2012), argues that the macroeconomic shocks that af-
fected Bolivia have been the main explanation for the decline in wage inequality. Other evidence
presented by Hernani-Limarino and Eid (2014) as well as Landa (2002) provides a similar expla-
nation suggesting that the decline in education returns accounts for most of the wage inequality
decline. These explanations are also supported by the evidence presented in this paper.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 briefly presents the trends in wage
inequality in Bolivia. Section 3 introduces the data and methods used in the paper. Section 4
summarizes the main results, and Section 5 presents the conclusions and provides some policy
recommendations.
2. A DECADE OF WAGE INEQUALITY
Labor income, also referred to as wages, is one of the most important sources of household in-
come. On average, they represent 87 percent of the average Bolivian household’s income. There-
fore, changes in the distribution of wages have a large impact on welfare across the population.
As argued by CEDLAS (2009), changes in the labor income distribution have been the main con-
tributor to the increase (1990s) and decline (early 2000s) in income inequality in the country.
Between 1995 and 2012, Bolivia went through many political and economic changes that
led to changes in the labor market conditions and macroeconomic stability of the country.4 Dur-
ing the period 1995 to 1999, Bolivia went through a series of privatization reforms (so-called
“second-generation” reforms) in an attempt to follow the regional trend of increasing foreign
private investment. The aim of these reforms was to increase the efficiency of newly privatized
companies as well as to create jobs. At the end of the 1990s and the beginning of the next decade,
Bolivia was affected by international crises such those in Asia, Mexico (at the end of the 1990s),
and especially Brazil and Argentina (between 1999 and 2002), yet the economy did not fall into a
4For a more comprehensive review of the labor market reforms in Bolivia, see Muriel and Jemio (2009).
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deep recession during this uncertain period. While several studies have shown the limited positive
effects of privatization in Bolivia, most of them concede that the reforms were effective in attract-
ing foreign direct investment as well as increasing exports, but their results were limited in terms
of job creation and inequality reduction.
With the election of President Morales in 2006, the new government decided to completely
change the economic set up through several policies that aimed to directly affect formal labor
markets. Initially, the government implemented a process of nationalization of strategic compa-
nies, which were previously privatized in the mid-1990s.5 The government also increased the
minimum monthly wage from 440 Bolivianos (US$ 55) in 2005 to 1440 Bolivianos (US$ 206)
in 2014 as a strategy to increase people’s wellbeing. In addition, higher taxes were implemented
in the hydrocarbons sector to increase government revenues; there was a large increase in public
sector spending; and an antidiscrimination law was implemented to reduce labor market discrimi-
nation towards indigenous populations.
Under these circumstances, it is useful to understand the main trends in the labor markets in
Bolivia. The delicate economic environment of the first half of the past decade (2000–05) had a
profound impact on labor markets. Between 2000 and 2005, average nominal wages remained
stagnant, but thanks to a fairly low rate of inflation, real wages did not deteriorate (Figure 1).
Starting in 2006, rapid economic growth was observed, mostly spurred by the rise in commod-
ity prices (mainly gas and minerals). Between 2005 and 2012, average nominal wages increased
by nearly 120 percent, which, despite increasing inflation, provided positive growth of nearly 40
percent in average real wages since 2005.
This period of fast wage growth coincided with a sharp reduction in wage inequality. Before
2005, the wage Gini coefficient for salaried workers in the urban sector had hovered around 0.5.
After 2005, following the rapid increase in the minimum wage as well as the implementation of
other labor market reforms, the Gini coefficient fell to below 0.37 in 2009, remaining low during
2011 and 2012 (Figure 1). The decline in wage inequality can also be observed when looking at
the income Gini coefficient for the total population in urban areas. While the income Gini shows
a higher degree of inequality compared to the wage Gini, it also presents a similar trend, with
substantial declines in inequality starting in 2007.
5Many state-owned companies went through a capitalization process during the government of Gonzalo Sanchez
de Lozada (1993 to 1997). This process transfer the ownership of 50 percemt of many state companies to private
parties.
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Figure 1: Nominal and Real Wage Trends
Source: Author estimations based on Household Surveys and Dossier UDAPE (2013).
Note: Real wages are deflated using 2007 as the base year. Average wages are estimated using workers in the urban
waged and salaried sector only, applying survey weights.
The main factor explaining the decline in wage inequality was the asymmetric growth of
wages across the whole wage distribution. Before 2005, wages across the whole distribution
showed little, if any, changes compared to 2000 levels (Figure 2a), and small negative changes
in real terms (Figure 2b). After 2006, while the bottom 75 percent of wages exhibited a similar
increase in wage growth, wages at the top of the distribution showed much lower growth, exhibit-
ing only a 15-percent growth compared to the 40-percent growth in the average real wage.
Figure 2: Trend of Nominal and Real Wages, Cumulative Growth Since 2000, Selected Percentiles
Note: Real wages are deflated using 2007 as the base year. Wage percentiles are estimated using workers in the urban
waged and salaried sector only, applying survey weights.
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3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Data
This paper uses the publicly available and nationally representative household surveys collected
annually by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) for the years 2000 through 2012.6 While
the sample design and the survey structure has changed over the years, making a year-by-year
comparison difficult, the information can still be used to make inferences at the national level.
In order to provide a representative sample of the labor force at the national level, and im-
prove comparability across years, the sample was restricted as follows. We included adults be-
tween 15 and 65 years of age who could be classified as a wage or salary worker at their primary
jobs.7 Given the volatility of the rural labor market, the sample includes workers in the urban sec-
tor only. Individuals classified as self-employed, employers, and family workers, as well as those
working in the military, and extraterritorial organizations, were excluded from the sample. The
final sample contained a total of 27,995 individuals across all years, which represents approxi-
mately 47 percent of the employed population between 15 to 65 years old in urban areas and 25
percent of the total employed population in Bolivia.
Given the purpose of the paper, wages were measured as monthly labor earnings from pri-
mary jobs, inclusive of tips, overtime, and commissions. Wages were measured in the local cur-
rency, adjusted for inflation using 2007 as the base year. In order to improve the sample size for
our analysis, we divided the sample into four groups. The first two groups correspond to the years
2000–02 and 2003–06, which are denominated as the period before Evo Morales, and the last
two groups of 2007–09 and 2011–12 cover the period of his presidency. While the correspond-
ing pooled samples do not provide an exact picture of the labor market structure for any given
year, they provide an adequate representation of the evolution and average characteristics within
pooled years.
6Until 2004, these surveys had been collected through the Program for the Improvement of Surveys and the Mea-
surement of Living Conditions in Latin America and the Caribbean (MECOVI in Spanish) with the cooperation of
the World Bank. Since 2004, the national statistical office, the Instituto Nacional de Estatisticas (INE), has indepen-
dently carried them out. The surveys are typically collected in November and December of each year. The 2003/04
household surveys, however, were collected monthly from November 2003 through November 2004. In 2010, no
information was collected. Data are available at the INE webpage, www.ine.gob.bo.
7Wage and salaried workers represent approximately 47 percent of the employed population in the urban labor market,
while self-employed workers represent almost 34 percent. The remaining 19 percent is composed of workers who
cannot be classified in either group, including family workers or apprentices, and household services.
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Tables 1 and 2 provide a statistical summary of the demographic and labor market character-
istics across year groups.8 Based on these statistics, the demographic characteristics of the labor
force have experienced some compositional changes. First, there has been an increase in female
labor force participation, which reflected an increase in the percentage of women in the work-
force from 31 percent to 36 percent. Similarly, the percentage of people in the workforce who
are identified as indigenous (based on first language learned) decreased. At the same time, while
there were no major changes regarding the age structure of the labor force, there was a small re-
duction in the percentage of younger workers in the labor market. In addition, there was a clear
increase in average education level, particularly an observed a decrease in the share of workers
with less than a high school education (19.6 percent to 12.6 percent) and an increase in the share
of workers with at least a college degree (16.1 percent to 25.1 percent).
Table 1: Statistical Summary: Demographics
2000-2002 2003-2006 2007-2009 2011-2012
Sex
Men 68.7% 68.2% 66.0% 63.7%
Women 31.3% 31.8% 34.0% 36.3%
Ethnicity
Non Indigenous 79.1% 82.8% 86.7% 86.0%
Indigenous 20.9% 17.2% 13.2% 14.0%
Age
15-19 7.8% 8.9% 7.7% 7.0%
20-29 36.2% 34.2% 33.9% 32.9%
30-39 26.0% 27.0% 28.3% 28.5%
40-49 19.9% 18.4% 17.9% 17.2%
50-59 8.8% 9.8% 10.1% 11.7%
60-65 1.3% 1.6% 2.2% 2.7%
Education
Primary Education (1-6) 19.6% 18.0% 14.6% 12.6%
Secondary Education (6-11) 25.0% 23.3% 20.2% 18.8%
High School Finished 19.6% 21.6% 24.6% 22.4%
Some College 19.8% 18.4% 18.7% 21.0%
College or more 16.1% 18.7% 21.9% 25.1%
N 6,154 6,240 6,200 9,401
Note: Based on our own calculations using weighted averages for salaried workers in the urban sector, using survey
expansion factors.
8All statistics are estimated using the survey expansion factors as weights.
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Table 2: Statistical Summary: Labor Market
2000-02 2003-06 2007-09 2011-12
Wage Level
Less than 1 Min wage 17.4% 17.9% 9.9% 12.1%
1-2 min wages 34.3% 35.9% 25.2% 29.9%
2-3 min wages 20.7% 19.8% 25.5% 25.6%
More than 3 min wages 27.7% 26.5% 39.5% 32.5%
Private sector 75.0% 77.5% 75.8% 74.3%
Public sector 25.0% 22.5% 24.2% 25.7%
Industry
Agriculture-Silviculture 3.6% 3.2% 2.5% 2.9%
Mining 1.9% 1.7% 2.1% 2.6%
Manufacture 17.9% 17.8% 15.6% 14.5%
Electricity, Gas & Water 1.3% 1.1% 0.7% 1.2%
Construction 11.3% 12.0% 12.6% 12.1%
Retail and repair 12.1% 12.1% 12.1% 13.2%
Food and hospitality 3.9% 4.4% 4.4% 5.5%
Transport 9.4% 10.5% 10.2% 8.5%
Financial services 2.0% 1.5% 2.2% 2.5%
Real State 5.4% 5.4% 5.3% 5.7%
Public Administration 7.6% 7.7% 9.3% 8.8%
Education 14.0% 12.5% 13.4% 12.8%
Social Services and Health 4.6% 4.7% 5.3% 5.9%
Other Services 5.1% 5.5% 4.2% 3.6%
Occupation
Management 3.3% 3.5% 2.5% 3.3%
Professionals 12.5% 13.6% 16.4% 20.6%
Technicians and Support 13.8% 13.3% 14.7% 11.5%
Clerical workers 10.6% 9.5% 9.9% 9.5%
Services and Retail 11.9% 12.8% 14.0% 14.3%
Agriculture 1.2% 1.7% 0.7% 0.7%
Mining, construction and manufacture 24.9% 24.7% 22.5% 17.0%
Machine operators/installation 10.7% 10.6% 9.3% 8.6%
Unqualified/unskilled jobs 11.2% 10.3% 10.0% 14.5%
N 6,154 6,240 6,200 9,401
Note: Based on our own calculations using weighted averages for salaried workers in the urban sector, using survey
expansion factors.
Regarding the labor market itself, there has been a sustained increase in average real wages,
higher than the growth in minimum wages. Between 2000 and 2006, there were no significant
changes in the percentage of workers per level of monthly earnings. In the last two periods, how-
ever, the percentage of people working for less than one minimum wage drastically decreased by
about 7 percentage points while the percentage of people earning more than three times the mini-
mum wage substantially increased. In terms of industry and occupation composition, while most
industry and occupation categories have shown little change over time, there are two changes
worth noting. The percentage of workers in the manufacturing industry has shown a significant
decline in the past five years, falling overall by about 4 percent compared to the percentage from
the 2000–02 period. With respect to occupation, the statistics show that the percentage of workers
in manufacturing and technical support has decreased while the percentage of workers in profes-
sional occupations and jobs for unqualified workers has increased.
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3.2 Methodology
To evaluate and decompose changes in inequality across time, we applied the methodology pro-
posed by Firpo et al. (2007). This methodology is a generalization of the Blinder-Oaxaca decom-
position approach (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca 1973), which allows one to extend the decomposition
analysis to statistics other than the mean. This method has two steps. The first involves the con-
struction of an appropriate counterfactual distribution with which the wage distribution can be
compared across time, maintaining changes in worker and market characteristics. Subsequently,
the constructed counterfactual wage distributions are used to obtain a decomposition of the in-
equality change of any statistic (v) into portions explained by measured differences in worker and
job characteristics (referred to as the “composition” effect) and by differences in the coefficients
or “returns” on observables (the “wage structure” effect).
Although the counterfactual wage distribution cannot be observed directly, Firpo et al. (2007)
show that under the assumptions of ignorability (conditional on measured covariates) and over-
lapping support of the covariates, it is possible to construct a counterfactual wage distribution that
would be observed if the people living in period t0 (2000-02) had experienced the wage struc-
ture observed in period tk (2011-12) (vˆt0,k). Firpo et al. demonstrate this using a reweighting
procedure where any distributional statistic corresponding to the counterfactual distribution is
estimated using observations from period t0 and a weight equal to ω̂c(X) =
pˆ(X)
1−pˆ(X) , where pˆ(X)
is an estimated probability (propensity). The propensity score is estimated using a probit model,
where the dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 if the person was ob-
served in the 2000-02 period and 1 if the person was observed in any other year. The explanatory
variables include a vector of characteristics X that determine wages.9 Once the counterfactual
statistic is found, the overall wage decomposition can be estimated as follows:
∆v = vtk − vt0 = (vtk − vˆt0,k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Sv :Wage structure effect
+ (vˆt0,k − vt0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆Xv :Composition effect
(1)
where ∆v is the overall intertemporal gap on the distributional statistic v, vtk and vt0 are the
statistics corresponding to the observed wage distributions in time k and time 0, and vˆt0,k is the
estimated statistic of the counterfactual wage distribution, with characteristics fixed to time 0 and
9This set of variables includes age, age square, sex, ethnicity, education level, public-or private-sector employment,
affiliation to labor unions, and dummy variables indicating industry and occupation classifications.
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time k.
The second step uses the novel “recentered influence function” (RIF) regression to obtain an
approximation of the contribution of each of the observed variables to the composition and wage
structure effects.10 RIF regression is similar to standard regression, except that instead of using
the dependent variable directly, in this case log (wages), it uses the recentered influence function
of the statistic of interest associated with that observation RIF (wi,k; vtk).
11 The RIF can be intu-
itively understood as a first-order approximation of the overall contribution that each observation
makes to the estimation of the statistic of interest v. Once this RIF variable is estimated for each
observation, it can be used to obtain a linear estimate of the average marginal effect each X has
on the distributional statistic v. A linear approximation for the conditional expectation of the RIF
is constructed in the form
E(RIF (wi; v)|X) = X ′ γ (2)




−1ΣX ′i,kR̂IF (wi,k; vk) for k = k, 0 (3)
γˆc = (Σωˆc(Xi,k)×X ′i,kXi,k)−1Σωˆc(Xi,k)×X ′i,kR̂IF (wi,k; vc) (4)
Here, ωˆc(Xi,0) is the implicit weight found in the first step. Using these parameters, we can define
terms equivalent in spirit to an Oaxaca decomposition for any statistic v, thus providing a detailed
decomposition of the wage structure and composition effects, shown below:
∆Sv = X
′
k(γˆk − γˆc) and ∆Xv = (Xkγˆc −X0γˆ0) (5)
Using the familiar Oaxaca terminology, the left-side “wage structure” effect is the portion
accounted for by coefficient differences, whereas the right-side “composition” effect is the por-
tion accounted for by differences in endowments.
10Details on the procedures used in the decomposition can be found in Firpo et al. (2007; 2009).
11The functional form for the RIF functions corresponding to the statistics proposed in this analysis can be found in
Firpo et al. (2007, pp. 22-24) and Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011, pp. 74-87).
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4. RESULTS
As indicated above, the RIF regression decomposition can be used to analyze any statistic that de-
scribes changes in wage distribution. Given the interest of this paper in analyzing wage inequality
changes over time, we implemented the procedure to analyze changes in the Gini coefficient and
provide results across quintiles and selected interquintiles. The first statistic provides an overview
of the change in income concentration across time, while the interquintiles provide a better pic-
ture of changes in inequality along the distribution.
4.1 Unconditional Quantile Regressions
To understand how wage structures in Bolivia have changed through time, Table 3 presents the
unconditional quintile regressions for selected quintiles for the first and last periods in the analy-
sis.12 Overall, while wages for lower quintiles have increased by about 0.46 log points between
2000-02 to 2011-12 (about 58 percent), the observed wage growth at the highest quintile was
only 0.08 log points (8 percent) for the same periods.
The estimated parameters provide some evidence regarding the trends of returns on different
characteristics. The parameters related to age show that there has been a drop in returns on ex-
perience, particularly for people in the top of the wage distribution. The wage gap between men
and women, while still large, is showing some reduction in the top and bottom of the distribution.
Returns (or rather penalties) among indigenous people show important progress, with estimates
suggesting that for the 2011-12 period, the wage penalties have practically been eliminated for
low wages, although at the top of the distribution the indigenous wage penalty remains high.
Perhaps some of the most important changes are the changes in the return on education.
Compared to workers with less than six years of formal education, all other levels of education
have shown improvements on returns for people at the bottom of the wage distribution. Looking
at the middle and top of the wage distribution, however, returns on a college education show a
strong reduction, with moderate improvements for workers with less than a high school educa-
tion.
12The unconditional quintile regressions are estimated using the RIF regressions described above, which, for the case
of quintiles, follow the strategy described by Firpo et al. (2009).
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Table 3: Unconditional Quantile Regressions, Selected Quantiles
Q10 Q50 Q90
2000–02 2011–12 2000–02 2011–12 2000–02 2011–12
Quantile (Log real wages) 6.007 6.461 6.962 7.336 8.058 8.133
Age
0.127* 0.107* 0.068* 0.048* 0.036+ 0.006
(0.015) (0.008) (0.006) (0.004) (0.016) (0.007)
Age2
-0.002* -0.001* -0.001* -0.000* 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sex (female)
-0.462* -0.335* -0.268* -0.239* -0.242* -0.166*
(0.061) (0.036) (0.024) (0.017) (0.081) (0.030)
Indigenous
-0.279* 0.019 -0.134* -0.025 -0.178* -0.137*
(0.064) (0.041) (0.030) (0.024) (0.067) (0.034)
Education
Secondary Education (6-11)
-0.083 0.132+ 0.056 0.120* -0.006 0.093+
(0.076) (0.058) (0.036) (0.030) (0.063) (0.041)
High School Finished
0.180+ 0.110 0.147* 0.061+ 0.119 0.078+
(0.073) (0.058) (0.042) (0.029) (0.086) (0.037)
Some College
0.109 0.173* 0.220* 0.149* 0.523* 0.164*
(0.091) (0.064) (0.046) (0.032) (0.119) (0.044)
College or more
0.269* 0.306* 0.533* 0.343* 2.230* 0.622*
(0.086) (0.065) (0.051) (0.036) (0.216) (0.060)
Public Sector (non Administrative)
0.149+ 0.201* -0.023 0.128* -0.411* 0.064
(0.060) (0.045) (0.037) (0.028) (0.122) (0.060)
Union member
0.195* 0.109* 0.123* 0.086* 0.061 0.123*
(0.044) (0.027) (0.028) (0.021) (0.096) (0.043)
N 6154 9401 6154 9401 6154 9401
Note: The base group comprises workers in the private sector, non-unionized, with less than a middle school
education, working in the transportation industry and a clerical occupation. Estimations are weighted using survey
expansion factors. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.01,+ p < 0.05 and  p < 0.1
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Table 3: Unconditional Quantile Regressions, Selected Quantiles (Continued)
Q10 Q50 Q90
2000–02 2011–12 2000–02 2011–12 2000–02 2011–12
Industry (base Transportation)
Agriculture
-0.145 0.249+ 0.038 0.227* -0.256 0.238+
(0.148) (0.119) (0.065) (0.056) (0.172) (0.103)
Mining
-0.074 0.243* 0.170+ 0.361* 0.006 1.713*
(0.133) (0.065) (0.082) (0.051) (0.329) (0.150)
Manufacture
0.131 0.260* 0.122+ 0.089+ -0.031 0.137+
(0.087) (0.063) (0.052) (0.036) (0.133) (0.062)
Electricity, Gas & Water
0.191 0.287* 0.378* 0.140 0.214 0.372+
(0.102) (0.098) (0.117) (0.083) (0.327) (0.167)
Construction
0.469* 0.494* 0.247* 0.407* -0.024 0.127
(0.097) (0.067) (0.061) (0.039) (0.151) (0.066)
Retail and repair
-0.106 0.206* 0.066 0.012 -0.147 0.009
(0.114) (0.070) (0.054) (0.037) (0.144) (0.058)
Food and hospitality
-0.268 0.022 -0.088 0.002 -0.191 0.015
(0.166) (0.106) (0.073) (0.041) (0.173) (0.060)
Financial services
0.034 0.433* 0.290* 0.249* 0.839+ 0.214
(0.117) (0.075) (0.073) (0.052) (0.365) (0.126)
Real State
0.072 0.134 0.157+ -0.04 -0.046 -0.046
(0.108) (0.086) (0.067) (0.041) (0.209) (0.069)
Public Administration
0.205+ 0.444* 0.279* 0.217* 0.241 0.045
(0.089) (0.061) (0.053) (0.037) (0.187) (0.069)
Education
-0.089 0.066 -0.164* -0.247* -1.422* -0.604*
(0.109) (0.078) (0.061) (0.042) (0.202) (0.087)
Social Services and Health
0.098 0.221* 0.099 -0.004 −0.381 -0.057
(0.106) (0.079) (0.066) (0.044) (0.230) (0.089)
Other Services
-0.308+ -0.124 -0.05 −0.085 -0.266 -0.099
(0.131) (0.115) (0.066) (0.050) (0.186) (0.074)
Occupation (base Clerical workers)
Management
-0.181+ -0.003 0.084 0.304* 2.476* 0.909*
(0.091) (0.062) (0.050) (0.043) (0.331) (0.123)
Professionals
-0.113 -0.032 -0.065 0.243* 0.913* 0.388*
(0.082) (0.053) (0.052) (0.035) (0.240) (0.070)
Technicians and Support
-0.280* -0.182* -0.062 0.049 0.284 0.139+
(0.084) (0.060) (0.044) (0.034) (0.157) (0.057)
Services and Retail
-0.256+ -0.267* -0.264* -0.143* -0.256 -0.003
(0.101) (0.065) (0.051) (0.033) (0.147) (0.044)
Mining, construction and manufacture
-0.353* -0.177* -0.336* -0.026 -0.377+ -0.065
(0.096) (0.066) (0.052) (0.037) (0.146) (0.054)
Machine operators/installation
-0.112 0.081 -0.164* 0.106+ -0.424* 0.102
(0.090) (0.063) (0.058) (0.042) (0.152) (0.070)
Agriculture and Unqualified workers
-0.319* -0.195* -0.422* -0.230* -0.291+ -0.084
(0.114) (0.069) (0.050) (0.034) (0.131) (0.043)
Constant
3.938* 4.178* 5.638* 6.114* 7.067* 7.458*
(0.282) (0.187) (0.114) (0.080) (0.293) (0.122)
N 6154 9401 6154 9401 6154 9401
Note: The base group comprises workers in the private sector, non-unionized, with less than a middle school ed-
ucation, working in the transportation industry and a clerical occupation. Estimations are weighted using survey
expansion factors. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.01,+ p < 0.05 and  p < 0.1
For the estimation of the impact of the market structure, industry and occupation, on wage
levels, the transportation industry and clerical occupations are used as base group categories. Re-
14
garding labor market characteristics, there is a strong increase in the returns on working in the
public sector (excluding public administration) across the wage distribution, especially at the top.
In contrast, the premium associated with working in public administration has declined in partic-
ular for wages at the top of the distribution. The industry parameters suggest that, compared to
transportation, all industries have shown gains in wage premiums across the wage distribution,
with the exception of real estate, food and hospitality, and financial services. Similarly, regarding
occupations, while improvements are observed across most occupations and wage distributions,
at the very top, the returns among management and professionals have experienced a sharp drop.
Based on the estimated constants for all of the models shown in Table 4, it is important to
note that there has been little change in the base wage at the top and bottom of the wage distribu-
tion, as seen in the constant. Around the middle of the wage distribution, however, the base wage
seems to have experienced the largest change across time.
4.2 Decomposition
Figure 3 provides a first look at wage decomposition across time. Panel A presents the overall
decomposition of wage changes between 2000–02 and 2003–06. As expected, there has been
little change in real wages across the distribution. The aggregate decomposition shows that the
changes in the returns to characteristics have had little if any effect on wages for most of the dis-
tribution. The results also suggest that, at the top of the distribution, there was an early tendency
of reducing returns on endowments. The change in endowments, however, was large enough that
it compensated for the fall in returns, translating to a virtually unchanged wage distribution be-
tween 2000 and 2006.
The 2000–02 to 2003–06 and 2007–09 to 2011–12 periods show similar trends regarding the
aggregate wage decomposition. On the one hand, the observed improvements in workers’ char-
acteristics explain only a small fraction of the wage improvements observed across these years,
except for workers at the top of the wage distribution. On the other hand, while the returns on
observed characteristics (wage structure changes) had a rather homogenous improvement across
most of the wage distribution, the change has been smaller and even negative at the very top of
the distribution. This suggests that the inequality improvements observed across time have been
mainly driven by changes in the wage structure, not by improvements in endowments. Similar
results were also found by Landa (2002), when analyzing the increase in wage inequality be-
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tween 1989 and 1999. The results regarding the first two periods are also similar to Gutierrez
(2008), where the author presents evidence that the wage structure effect, for the 1999–2005 pe-
riod, slightly improved wage inequality.
Figure 3: Aggregate Quintile Wage Decomposition, 2000–2002
Note: The information corresponds to the smoothed contributions of the wage structure and characteristics changes
to the total wage change between 2000 and 2002 and other periods.
Rather than looking at each individual quintile, it is more informative to implement the de-
composition on statistics such as the Gini coefficient and interquintile differences (Table 4). As
shown above, between 2000–02 and 2003–06, there was almost no change in wage inequality,
with only small differences in the interquintile gaps.
Comparing the base period to the 2007–09 and 2011–12 periods, the Gini coefficient de-
creased by 0.08 and 0.1 points, respectively. Because wages across most of the distribution expe-
rienced similar growth, the interquintile estimations show that the improvements can be explained
by a reduction in the gap at the top of the distribution. As suggested by the unconditional quintile
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regressions, these results also indicate that all the inequality improvements have been caused by
changes in the wage structure and that changes in worker and market characteristics have played
a marginal role in decreasing the wage gap.
Table 4: Wage Inequality Decomposition, Selected Statistics
Gini q10-q90
03–06 07–09 11–12 03–06 07–09 11–12
2000/02 0.487 0.487 0.487 2.050 2.050 2.050
Other period 0.490 0.398 0.370 2.045 1.766 1.672
Total Change
0.003 -0.089* -0.117* -0.005 -0.284* -0.379*
(0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.065) (0.052) (0.046)
Change on Wage Structure
−0.021 -0.104* -0.138* -0.123+ -0.329* -0.450*
(0.012) (0.010) (0.008) (0.059) (0.052) (0.049)
Change on Characteristics
0.024* 0.015* 0.021* 0.118* 0.044* 0.072*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.042) (0.009) (0.021)
N 12,394 12,354 15,555 12,394 12,354 15,555
q10-50 q50-q90
03–06 07–09 11–12 03–06 07–09 11–12
2000/01 0.955 0.955 0.955 1.096 1.095 1.095
Other period 0.941 0.913 0.846 1.105 0.853 0.796
Total Change
-0.014 −0.042 -0.079* 0.009 -0.242* -0.299*
(0.030) (0.024) (0.022) (0.062) (0.046) (0.043)
Change on Wage Structure
-0.033 −0.046 -0.101* −0.090 -0.283* -0.349*
(0.039) (0.024) (0.027) (0.049) (0.045) (0.048)
Change on Characteristics
0.019 0.004 0.022 0.099* 0.041+ 0.049*
(0.021) (0.013) (0.017) (0.032) (0.016) (0.016)
N 12,394 12,354 15,555 12,394 12,354 15,555
Note: Bootstrap Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.01,+ p < 0.05 and  p < 0.1.
To better understand which factors are driving the observed changes in the wage structure,
Table 5 presents the detailed decomposition of the Gini coefficient with respect to all worker and
market characteristics. As described before, there was an important decrease in the Gini coeffi-
cient between the 2000–02 and 2011–12 periods, most of which can be attributed to changes in
the wage structure.
Among other factors, while the gender gap has shown some reduction along the wage distri-
bution, the Gini decomposition shows that these changes have increased wage inequality by 0.008
points between the first and last periods of the analysis. The reduction of the wage gap between
indigenous and non-indigenous people, however, has been large enough to contribute to a decline
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in inequality (0.009). In contrast, the changes in the levels of participation among women and
indigenous people in the labor market have created increased wage inequality. Regarding educa-
tion, the systematic decline in returns on education, particularly for workers with some college
and a college degree, has been one of the most important factors contributing to the decline of the
Gini coefficient (0.032 points). The increasing share of workers with college education, however,
has contributed to a small increase in wage inequality.
In contrast with expectations, the increase in the wage associated with working in the public
sector has no effect on wage inequality. Regarding the benefit of being unionized, while unions
have reduced wage inequality on average (Rios-Avila and Hirsch, 2014), the evidence shown here
indicates that across time, the changes in union wage benefits have contributed to an increase in
wage inequality (0.015).
Finally, changes on returns of working in specific industries have had an insignificant effect
on wage inequality in the aggregate. On the other hand, the decline in wages among occupations
such as management, professional jobs, and technology has contributed to a strong decline in
inequality (0.06 points). Still, the increase in the percentage of professionals in services and retail
had a small positive contribution to inequality.
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Table 5: Wage Inequality, Detailed Decomposition (Gini)
00/02 vs 03/06 00/02 vs 07/09 00/02 vs 11/12
Wage Structure Comp Wage Structure Comp Wage Structure Comp
Total -0.021 0.024* -0.104* 0.015* -0.138* 0.021*
(0.012) (0.005) (0.010) (0.004) (0.008) (0.003)
Demographics
Age 0.138 -0.004 -0.072 -0.014+ 0.051 -0.024*
(0.212) (0.004) (0.181) (0.006) (0.154) (0.005)
Age2 -0.040 0.006 0.061 0.015* -0.020 0.026*
(0.118) (0.005) (0.094) (0.006) (0.080) (0.005)
Sex (1 = Woman) -0.011 0.000 0.004 0.001 0.008 0.002*
(0.007) (0.000) (0.008) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000)
Indigenous -0.010* 0.001+ 0.002 -0.002 -0.009+ 0.002*
(0.004) (0.000) (0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.001)
Education
Sec. Education (6-11) -0.004 0.000 0.004 -0.001 -0.004 0.000
(0.004) (0.000) (0.005) (0.001) (0.005) (0.001)
High School Finished 0.007 0.000 0.011 0.002 0.002 0.000
(0.006) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000)
Some College 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.000 -0.005 0.000
(0.008) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
College or more 0.013 0.008* -0.019* 0.007* -0.032* 0.006*
(0.009) (0.002) (0.007) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002)
Public Sector -0.019 0.006+ 0.014 0.000 0.011 0.000
(non-administrative) (0.010) (0.003) (0.010) (0.001) (0.007) (0.000)
Union 0.013 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.015+ 0.000
(0.010) (0.001) (0.008) (0.001) (0.006) (0.000)
Industry 0.001 0.008 0.002 -0.022 0.028 0.005
(0.003) (0.049) (0.002) (0.052) (0.034) (0.003)
Occupation 0.003 -0.303 0.005* -0.016 -0.048+ 0.006*
(0.002) (0.309) (0.002) (0.028) (0.021) (0.001)
Constant -0.089 -0.076 -0.137
(0.106) (0.102) (0.088)
Error 0.004 0.000 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
N 12,394 12,354 15,555
Note: The base group comprised workers in the private sector, non-unionized, with less than a middle school edu-
cation, working in the transportation industry and a clerical occupation. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.01,+ p < 0.05 and  p < 0.1. Industry and occupation report aggregated effect of all industry and
occupation dummies wage structure and composition effect.
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4.3 Beyond the Formal Labor Market: Self-employed Workers and Market
Opportunities
In the previous section, we presented and analyzed the decomposition of the evolution of wage
inequality within the wage and salaried labor market. While wages in this segment of the la-
bor market can be most directly affected by policies in the labor market, they represent only a
fraction of the urban labor force (47 percent), although its share has increase in 4 percentage
points during the period analyzed. To provide a more complete view of trends in labor income
inequality, this section provides a brief overview of the changes in inequality for self-employed
workers. The self-employed labor market has unique characteristics that differentiate it from the
wage/salaried labor market. On the one hand, earned income is lower on average, but its inequal-
ity is much larger compared to that among salaried workers (Gini of 0.54 vs. 0.48 in the formal
market). In addition, while the salaried market can be directly affected by labor/wage changes via
employment contracts, the self-employed market lacks contracts that would otherwise regulate
wages and employment. In this sense, one might expect the evolution of labor income inequality
in the self-employed to be less sensitive to wage economic policies.
In Table 6, we present the decomposition of the Gini index and interquintile differences in
wages for self-employed workers in urban areas, using the same specifications as those used in
the previous sections. Different from salaried workers, between the first and second periods,
wage inequality showed a significant, albeit small, decline in inequality, with a fall of 0.03 Gini
points. In the salaried market, comparing the first period to the 2007–09 period, a large decline in
inequality was observed, with very little progress among the self-employed. Only when compar-
ing Gini changes with respect to the last period (2011–12) can we see an important reduction in
inequality, fully explained by changes in the market wage structure.
The estimations regarding the interquintile gaps also tell a different story compared to the
salaried market. In the salaried marked, there were small, if any, improvements closing the wage
gap in the lower part of the wage distribution (q10–q50), while most of the inequality improve-
ments were explained by a reduction in the upper section of the wage distribution (q50–q90),
which was observed in the later periods. In the self-employed market, the estimates indicate that
wage inequality was reduced by closing the wage gap both in the upper and lower sections of
the wage distribution. This economic structure change, however, had a delayed impact on wage
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inequality, and its effects could not be observed until the later years (2011–12). The changes in
characteristics across years had a negligible effect on the trends in inequality.
Table 6: Wage Inequality Decomposition for Self-employed Workers, Selected Statistics
Gini q10-q90 q50-q90
Alternative year: 03/06 07/09 11/12 03/06 07/09 11/12 03/06 09/12 11/12
Index in 2000/01 0.535 0.535 0.535 1.597 1.597 1.597 1.180 1.180 1.180
Index in Other period 0.503 0.505 0.454 1.397 1.420 1.316 1.098 1.134 0.976
Total Change
-0.032+ -0.029+ -0.080* -0.199* -0.177* -0.281* -0.082 -0.046 -0.204*
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.047) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.042) (0.043)
Change on Wage Structure
-0.036* -0.029+ -0.078* -0.189* -0.164* -0.278* -0.089 -0.058 -0.236*
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.046) (0.060) (0.062) (0.049) (0.049) (0.045)
Change on Characteristics
0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.01 -0.012 -0.003 0.007 0.012 0.032
(0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.017) (0.030) (0.039) (0.019) (0.021) (0.024)
N 11,758 9,07 11,553 11,758 9,07 11,553 11,758 9,07 11,553
Note: The sample includes self-employed workers in the urban area only. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
∗ p < 0.01,+ p < 0.05 and  p < 0.1.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Contrary to the trend in the developed world, Latin American countries have shown a sharp de-
cline in wage inequality during the past decade (2000–12). Bolivia has also experienced this de-
cline, especially in the second part of the past decade. Using the methodology of RIF regression
decomposition, we found that after 2006, wages increased across the wage distribution, with the
largest changes observable at lower quintiles. This may be related to legislation, such as increases
in the minimum wage as well as anti-discrimination policies.
Among other factors, we find that there has been a sharp reduction in returns on higher ed-
ucation at the top of the distribution, as well as increases for returns for low educated workers,
which has contributed to the decline of wage inequality. Similarly, wages in occupations with
traditionally highly paid jobs have consistently decreased, further contributing to the wage in-
equality decline. It is possible that the observed changes in inequality are related to increases of
the minimum wage, which have multiplicative effects on public-sector wage rates due to salary
structures. While these changes have contributed to the decline of wage inequality, improving the
earnings of those with otherwise low incomes, the decline in returns on higher education might
21
create incentives for educated workers to look for better job opportunities, leading to potential
emigration (brain drain).
A lesson from the decompositions is that most of the changes occurred during the second
part of the decade in question (2005–12). This implies that a combination of economic policies
and favorable macroeconomic conditions have been successful in reducing wage inequality in ur-
ban areas in Bolivia. It remains to be seen, however, if these improvements are long lasting, since
the reduction in labor income inequality has not been accompanied by improvements in workers’
characteristics (education, experience, and skill). Although improvements in the working con-
ditions (wages) of the most vulnerable populations is an important step toward reducing income
inequality, to the extent that these changes are not accompanied by equal gains in workers’ pro-
ductivity, the reductions in inequality might not be sustainable in the long run.
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